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I.  Introduction 
The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), an agency of the United States 
Department of Justice (USDOJ), works to seize illicit drugs, prosecute those who partake 
in and provide illicit drugs, and coordinate drug enforcement activities with other 
agencies.
1
  The DEA was recently accused of being unable to analyze the effectiveness of 
its policies, actions, and the illicit drugs market.  Much analysis of the illicit drug market 
has been made with data maintained by the DEA within the System to Retrieve Drug 
Evidence (STRIDE) database.  This database contains information regarding the quantity, 
purity, and price of illicit drugs seized in the United States.  The location of each 
purchase or seizure of an illicit drug is also recorded.  This data is obtained through the 
work of undercover agents, interviews with those who have been arrested for illicit drug 
activities, and the Metropolitan Police of the District of Colombia which is the only other 
agency which contributes information to the database.  Understanding trends in illicit 
drugs prices allows policy makers and field agents to better devote their resources, and to 
understand what drugs are most likely to be abused.   
The quality of research that can be accomplished using STRIDE price data of two 
drugs in particular, cocaine freebase (crack cocaine) and heroin, has been discussed in 
two recent papers.  Horrowitz (2001) suggests that the price estimates in the database 
cannot be used to predict trends of illicit drug use.  Using STRIDE data Horrowitz shows 
that there are large variations in the estimates of the price of the same quantity and type 
of drug within the same city by different law enforcement agencies.  Arkes et. al. (2008) 
                                                          
1
 “DEA Staffing and Budget” DEA http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/agency/staffing.htm December 2008 
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argue that Horrowitz’s accusations were flawed.  The authors suggest that Horrowitz’s 
analysis failed to account for the different scope of the agencies involved in making the 
drug seizures, and variations in the purity of the drugs that were seized or purchased.  The 
authors develop a model that includes measures to control for the operations of drug 
enforcement agencies in a given region, and the purity of a seized drug.  Their analysis 
suggests that there is less variation in the price of an illegal drug than Horrowitz 
originally concluded.  The authors also use their predictions of drug prices to 
significantly predict drug-overdose emergency room visits, which they claim are an 
independent indicator of drug demand.  
 Arkes et al.’s proclamation of confidence in the quality of price data within the 
STRIDE database must have brought a modicum of comfort to the authors and federal 
employees that have used this database for research.  There have been many published 
uses of STRIDE estimates of the street price of drugs.  Caulkins (1994) and Rhodes et al. 
(1994) created a price-index for illegal drugs.  Saffer and Chaloupka (1995), Chaloupka 
et al. (1998), and Grossman et al. (1996) used the data to estimate demand for illegal 
drugs, and DeSimone (1998) used it to study whether marijuana is a gateway drug for the 
use of cocaine. Yuan and Caulkins (1998), DiNardo (1993), and Crane et al. (1997) 
investigated the effects of enforcement actions on the prices of illegal drugs.  Boyum et 
al. (1994) attempted to predict future trends of the market for heroin.  Caulkins (1997) 
investigated the relative prices of crack and powder cocaine, and Bach et al. (1999) 
investigated the relation between heroin prices and changes in the use of heroin by users 
seeking methadone treatment.  Many federal agencies and policy makers use STRIDE 
data to estimate quantities of illegal drugs consumed in the U.S, although the results of 
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their research are not typically published.  Considering the amount of effort that is spent 
by the federal government combating the use and trade of illicit drugs, it is likely that the 
government would want to be able to quickly predict the overall usage trends of a given 
drug.  In fact the explicit purpose of the STRIDE database is to store all information 
regarding a particular piece of drug evidence, in order to study the trends of its use.
2
   
Given the cocaine industry’s nature it seems there are other economic factors 
driving demand and supply of illicit drugs, which are not systematically collected by 
enforcement agencies and could be used to study trends.  For example, the real exchange 
rate between the United States and Colombia might be a useful indicator to predict trends 
in the illicit cocaine market.  If an exogenous variable like the real exchange rate was 
significantly correlated with the use of cocaine this would allow the government a readily 
accessible variable to help analyze the cocaine market.  Theoretically, if the dollar 
appreciated against the Colombian peso one would expect to see more cocaine use, and 
therefore more cocaine seized.  If the dollar depreciated against the Colombian peso one 
would expect to see less cocaine use, less cocaine seized.  The change in this particular 
exchange rate could also be related to use and seizures of other drugs that are potential 
substitutes for dollar holding cocaine users. 
In this paper I develop a statistical model which analyzes the impact of several 
variables on quarterly seizures of cocaine by the DEA from 1981-2007.  I develop this 
model utilizing what is known of the cocaine industry, and I analyze the model using two 
different measurements for the price of cocaine, and two different estimates of the price 
                                                          
2
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of substitute drugs.  Data regarding the total number of seizures and estimates of the price 
of cocaine and substitutes for cocaine are from the STRIDE database.  Initial results 
suggest that variation in the real exchange rate explains variation in seizures of cocaine, 
when analyzing seizure data that omits DEA estimates for the price of cocaine.  
Additional analysis of the data shows that cocaine price estimates from the STRIDE 
database are also correlated with cocaine seizures, though this relationship is stronger 
with other exogenous variables proposed in the model.   
This paper is broken into four sections.  In the first I provide an overview of the 
cocaine industry.  I provide an overview of the theoretical model I developed and I 
outline the methodology for analyzing the data in the second and third sections, in the 
fourth section I offer analysis, and in the fifth conclusions. 
II.  Overview of the cocaine industry 
Cocaine is the product of the coca plant.  The plant grows best in hot damp forest 
clearings, though the plants which produce some of the most desirable leaves, those with 
the best taste, are grown on drier hillsides (Karch 2006).  The plants are first allowed to 
mature as seeds in small highly nutrient rich plots that are protected from direct sunlight, 
and  are then transplanted into burned out rainforest land or terraced hillsides.  These 
plants are then regularly fertilized, weeded, pruned, and receive occasional applications 
of pesticide (Allen 2001).  The cultivation of the coca plant is the most labor intensive 
aspect of the production process of cocaine.  It takes up to 18 months for a plant to 
mature into a bush that can yield a sustainable crop, and a well maintained coca plant can 
continue to yield a desirable crop for many years.  
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 A single coca plant can be harvested up to six times in a single growing season.  
After they are harvested the green coca leaves, known as matu, are spread in thin layers 
on the ground and dried in the sun for several days in order to be preserved.  They are 
then packed in burlap sacks, which are kept dry in order to preserve the quality of the 
leaves.
3
  It takes 350kg’s of coca leaves to produce a single kilogram of cocaine base, 
which yields a little less than a single kilogram of precipitated cocaine crystals more 
commonly referred to as coke.  Transforming coca into cocaine base depends on many 
kilograms of harsh chemicals which include sulfuric acid, sulfate salts, potassium 
permanganate, and ammonium hydroxide.  This is commonly completed using kerosene, 
lime, and sulfuric acid.  To transform the cocaine base into precipitated cocaine crystals 
requires ether, acetone, and hydrochloric acid (Allen 2001).  It is important to note that 
“cocaine base” is not “freebase cocaine” or crack cocaine.  Crack cocaine is made using 
coke, baking soda, and water.  These ingredients are combined into a liquid solution that 
is then dehydrated, and the resulting solid is broken into tiny chunks that dealers sell as 
crack rocks (Saferstein 2007).   
 Three countries are responsible for the world’s supply of cocaine: Bolivia, Peru, 
and Colombia.  Colombia is responsible for processing a supermajority of the world’s 
cocaine and 90% of the cocaine in the United States has been grown, processed, or 
simply passed through Colombia at some point.
4
  Colombia is in a unique position to 
produce, process, and distribute cocaine given the monopoly the revolutionary cartels 
FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas) and ELN (Ejercito de 
                                                          
3 “Coca” Wikipedia—The free Encyclopedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coca#Cultivation 8 December 
2008 
4
 Source Countries and Drug Danger Zones, Office of National Drug Control Policy, 
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/international/colombia.html 12 October 2008 
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Liberacion Nacional) have on cocaine industry.  These organizations tax and protect coca 
growers, cocaine processers, and control the mechanisms by which the cocaine can be 




Cocaine production in Colombia begins with the individual farmers that cultivate 
coca, and produce cocaine base.  The base is then bought by the drug cartels and is 
processed into coke in labs deep in the Colombian jungle.  These farmers are 
compensated for their work in local currency.  After the drug is refined, it is shipped out 
of Colombia for distribution throughout North America.  The total profits seen by the 
drug cartels of Colombia as a direct result of their involvement in the cocaine industry 
were estimated in 2000 to be between $2-10 billion.  This is equivalent to 71% of 
Colombia’s total legal exports of that year (Allen 2001). 
 Cocaine makes its way from Colombia the United States through one of 6 
mechanisms. The according to 2001 estimates made by the DEA and the USDOJ cocaine 
is smuggled into the United States through: direct shipments out of Columbia by air 
(5%), from Mexico by land (45%), and Panama (15%) Puerto Rico (10%) Hispaniola 
(10%), Jamaica (10%) and the Bahamas (5%) by boat and is smuggled past US customs 
within licit commercial cargo.   Distribution of cocaine throughout the United States 
depends on the mechanism by which it was smuggled into the United States, as is the 
ultimate street price of the drug (Allen 2001).  Horrowitz (2001) also explains that 
different regions of the United States are used for different purposes of the cocaine 
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 Key Farc role in US cocaine trade, BBC http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6353449.stm 12 February 
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industry, and cities key to the import of cocaine demand different resources from the 
DEA than cities which are regional distribution points.  Chicago, Dallas, and Cleveland 
are major regional distributers of cocaine; Houston, San Diego, El Paso are places where 
cocaine often initially enters the country.  New York and Miami are cities where cocaine 
often enters the country and are places that serve as major regional cocaine distributers.  
Once inside the United States precipitated cocaine is often “cut” or mixed with other 
substances so that the cocaine product that is sold is not pure coke.  Additionally, the 
product is weighed into small samples, usually around one gram, before it is sold to users.  
III. Overview of theoretical model 
  I assume the amount of cocaine that will be seized in a given period depends on 
the resources available to pursue investigations of cocaine use and distribution.  When 
examining how much cocaine the DEA will seize the resources available to the DEA and 
other law enforcement agencies must also be taken into account.  The amount of tax 
dollars the DEA is allocated fluctuates over time.  The level of operations the DEA will 
be able to conduct in a tight budget year will differ from the level of operations the DEA 
will be able to conduct when they are afforded more resources.  Similarly the efforts of 
other law enforcement agencies to pursue and prosecute illicit drug activities will 
fluctuate over time.  Additionally, I assume the level of corruption throughout these law 
enforcement agencies will negatively impact the amount of cocaine that can be taken off 
the market, and will affect the overall seizures the DEA can make.   
Seizures of cocaine in the US also depend on the quantity of cocaine traded in the 
US market.  This depends on the demand and supply of cocaine.  Some factors that I 
assume will affect the supply of cocaine on the market include the success of the coca 
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growing season and the amount of cocaine produced, the number of individuals involved 
in the cocaine industry in cocaine producing nations, and the ability of the cocaine 
producing nations to prohibit the production and distribution of the drug.  As this paper 
described previously, coca grows best in warm wet climates.  When examining the case 
of Colombia, coca producing regions in this nation are not immune to droughts and other 
climatic shocks, though dramatic fluctuations in the weather throughout the year given 
the nation’s proximity to the equator are rare.  The amount of people involved in the 
cocaine industry in Colombia depends on the state of the Colombian economy.  
Additionally, the Colombian government has been engaged in an extensive civil war, has 
a history of conflict, and the ability of the Colombian drug cartels to manipulate the 
government has been well documented.  Colombia has an extensive history of smuggling, 
and a culture that rewards individuals that make fast profits (Allen 2001).  The ability of 
the Colombian government to impact the production of cocaine in turn impacts the 
supply of cocaine on the illicit drug market. 
   I assume that demand for cocaine depends on the price of cocaine, the cocaine 
user population’s size, and the income of cocaine users.  The effects of each of these 
variables on the demand for cocaine are assumed as follows: if the price of cocaine 
increases cocaine demand falls, if the population of users increases the demand for 
cocaine rises, and if the income of cocaine users goes up cocaine demand rises.  In a 
standard market, one might also immediately consider the effect the price of a substitute 
for cocaine would have on the market.  If cocaine were traded in a licit market, a price 
increase in cocaine might drive regular cocaine users towards another drug.  This is 
complicated in the existing cocaine market as many cocaine users are addicted to the 
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drug, and are willing to pay any going price in order to experience the drug’s effect.  In 
fact, cocaine is the most addictive drug known to man.
6
  Other drugs like Ritalin, PCP, 
epinephrine, and methamphetamine all produce effects that are similar to cocaine when 
used.  A cocaine user might resort to using one of these drugs, if the price of cocaine 
became too high. 
 Considering these factors and assumptions this paper will use the following 








Here, seizures of cocaine (S
US
t) by the DEA is a function of the resources available to the 
DEA (Rt), the activities of other law enforcement agencies (OLEt), the level of corruption 
within the DEA (C
D
t), and the quantity of cocaine traded on the US market (Q
UST
t).   
The quantity of cocaine traded on the market is also a function that can be 














 Here, the quantity of cocaine trades on the market is a result of the price of cocaine (P
C
t), 
the price of substitutes for cocaine (P
S
t), the amount of precipitation in coca growing 
regions (RFt), the income of cocaine users (Y
US
t), the size of the cocaine user population 
(POPt), the level of productivity in Colombia (P
COL
t), and the amount of corruption in 
Colombia (C
F
t).   
III.  Methodology and Data 
 Quantitative analysis of the proposed theoretical model using OLS was 
complicated by several factors.  First, quarterly data regarding seizures of cocaine is not 
                                                          
6 Streatfeild, Dominic 2001 Cocaine—An unauthorized biography St. Martin’s Press New York 86-93 
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readily accessible.  Though pursued through a Freedom of Information Act request, this 
data has not yet been analyzed and applied to the model.  Instead quarterly estimates of 
cocaine seizures were made by assuming that annual seizures of cocaine were made 
equally throughout each quarter of the year.  Second, measuring corruption in both the 
United States and Colombia is challenging, and is often the result of extensive modeling.  
Third, though many national level crime statistics for the US are reported annually by the 
FBI, no information is available regarding how many arrests were made by law 
enforcement agencies around the country for cocaine specific crimes, nor for any other 
drug related activity.  Fourth, as a government agency the DEA receives an annual 
appropriation and little information is available regarding how this appropriation is used 
within a given fiscal year.  Fifth, although annual estimates are made of the amount of 
first time cocaine users or cocaine initiates, no estimates are made of the size of the entire 
cocaine user population. 
To estimate corruption in the United States and Colombia two different 
approaches were used.  To measure corruption in the United States the annual 
appropriation of the Office of the Inspector General of the USDOJ was analyzed as a 
percentage of the overall budget of the USDOJ.  The Office of the Inspector General 
(OIG) has conducted internal investigations throughout the USDOJ since its inception in 
1989.  Since the data set detailing cocaine seizures spans from 1981-2007, the level of 
corruption in the US prior to the OIG’s inception was estimated.  This variable when 
regressed against cocaine seizures would be positive, if when more funding was devoted 
to fighting corruption (as a percentage of the USDOJ budget), more cocaine was seized.  
For the sake of simplicity, and given the lack of data, the amount of resources devoted to 
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fighting corruption was assumed to be zero from 1981 through 1988.  Quarterly estimates 
of the resources available to the OIG were made by assuming the office had the same 
amount of resources in every quarter of the year.  When analyzed in the regression, the 
budget of the OIG was analyzed as a percentage of the overall budget of the USDOJ.   
To measure corruption in Colombia the proportion of net errors and omissions to 
total exports on Colombia’s capital account was examined.  The theory behind this 
method of analysis is that in years where there are a tremendous amount of errors and 
omissions in the capital account there is less understanding of the movement of goods 
throughout the economy, and t therefore more corruption exists within the nation.  This 
method for measuring corruption has been used by MacAfee (1980), O’Higgins (1989), 
Smith (1985), Petersen (1982), Del Boca (1981), and Park (1979).  This is an 
extraordinarily rough measure of corruption and has been subject to much criticism.  It 
seemed reasonable, however, to use this variable given the amount of time available to 
analyze this model.  Quarterly error and omissions reports were not reported by Colombia 
before 1996.  For these years where quarterly data was unavailable, the annual proportion 
of the errors and omissions relative to total exports was applied to all four quarters of the 
year. 
While no data which summarized the total arrests made by law enforcement 
agencies for cocaine use, possession, or distribution throughout the US could be found, 
there is ample evidence that the crime most often committed by illegal drug users is 
Driving Under the Influence.
7
  Arresting individuals of this action was assumed to be a 
                                                          
7
 “Drug Related Crime—March 2000” Office of National Drug Control Policy 
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/factsht/crime/index.html 12 November 2008 
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rough proxy for arrests made for illicit activity.  Available data in the Uniform Crime 
Reports maintained by the FBI regarding the number of DUI incidents in a given year 
was divided by the size of the US population in a given year to control for population 
changes.  It was assumed that the annual number of arrests was the same in all four 
quarters of a given year. 
The problems associated with analyzing the operating budget of the OIG in the 
regression were similar to the problems associated with analyzing the operating budget of 
the DEA, to measure the amount of resources available to the DEA.  The DEA receives 
an annual budget appropriation form the US Congress, and there is no information 
available regarding how this funding is used throughout the year.  It was assumed that the 
annual appropriation was used equally throughout the quarters of the fiscal year.  When 
analyzed in the regression, the budget of the DEA was analyzed as a percentage of the 
overall budget of the USDOJ.  It is important to note that all of the data was analyzed on 
a calendar year basis, not a fiscal year basis, and was all analyzed on the same time scale. 
To estimate the size of the cocaine user population, data available in the 
Department and Health and Human Services National Survey on Drug Use and Health 
(NSDUH) was analyzed.  This survey was formerly known as the National Survey on 
Household Drug Abuse.   The survey makes an annual estimate of how many Americans 
used a wide variety of illicit substances for the first time in a given year.  This population 
of individuals is called the initiate population.  The survey’s annual estimate of cocaine 
initiates was used as a proxy for changes in the size of the cocaine user population.  It 
was assumed that an equal number of individuals used cocaine for the first time 
throughout the four quarters of a year. When analyzing this data in the regression, this 
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variable was lagged back one period, as it was assumed that the amount of cocaine users 
from one period is likely to influence the number of users in the next.  
An empirical model of seizures of cocaine must also recognize that incorporating 
a price variable in a model of any illicit drug also poses significant challenges.  First, the 
purity of an illicit drug is unknown until after it has been purchased and used by an 
individual, and therefore the true value of the drug in question is not known at the time of 
its sale.  Second, the price of a drug of a given purity may differ by volume of individual 
transactions.  Third, the purity and quantity of drugs actually distributed for sale varies by 
location, and may be dependent on the relationship an individual has with a drug dealer.  
Generally, local variations in price will mirror national trends, but substantial variations 
in local and national market prices are possible (Arkes 2008).  Given the nature of the 
cocaine industry in Columbia, suspecting that the real exchange rate might be helpful in 
measuring changes in domestic seizures of cocaine makes sense.    Cocaine is like any 
other commodity of Colombia as the United States dollar strengthens against the 
Colombian peso, cocaine becomes cheaper for Americans to buy, and this is true 
regardless of the purity of a given sample of cocaine.  As this paper has discussed 
previously both the dollar and peso are used throughout the production and sale of 
cocaine.  Additionally, since the analysis in this paper is focusing on national level 
seizures, national estimates of the price of cocaine should be correlated with the total 
amount of cocaine seized by the DEA throughout the US. 
To analyze the price of cocaine variable in the proposed in the theoretical model 
the real exchange rate between the Colombian peso and US dollar, and price estimates 
available through published reports of the Office of National Drug Control Policy were 
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applied to the regression.  These estimates are the result of analysis of the STRIDE 
database conducted by the RAND Corporation, and are real price levels pegged to a 1993 
base year.  To analyze the price of a substitute of cocaine price data available for 
methamphetamine, which was published in the same analysis of other price data within 
the STRIDE database conducted by the RAND corporation, was applied to the model.  
The price index of alcohol available through the Bureau of Labor Statistics was also used 
to estimate the cocaine substitute variable, as this index is the result of real data analysis 
of a widely distributed product, and is not the result of a series of investigations and 
interviews, unlike the data available through the STRIDE database.   This index is pegged 
to a 1990 base year.  
To evaluate the other variables in the proposed theoretical model, rainfall data 
collected in coca growing regions of Colombia made available through the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Association’s National Climactic Data Center.  To estimate 
changes in income of the cocaine user population changes in the median income of the 
US were analyzed.  Since the median income of the US is analyzed only on an annual 
basis, it was assumed the median income remained the same in all four quarters of a 
given year.  For the Colombian productivity variable, a productivity index that measures 
industrial productivity that is maintained by the Colombian Bureau of National Statistics 
was utilized.  Additionally, a time variable to control for the fact that seizures and the 
other variables in the model might simply reflect changes over time are correlated with 
one another was included when analyzing the regression. 
Summary of Data Applied and Collected 
Theoretical Model Applied Variable Source of Data 
Cocaine seizures Cocaine seizures (kg’s) DEA 
DEA Resources Operating Budget of DEA, as DEA, USDOJ 
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percentage of USDOJ Budget 
appropriation 
Other US drug law 
enforcement activity  
DUI arrests as percentage of US 
population 
FBI—Uniform Crime Reports 
US Corruption Resources devoted to fighting US 
corruption:  Operating Budget of 
the Office of the Inspector 
General, as percentage of USDOJ 
Budget Appropriation 
OIG, USDOJ 
Price of cocaine  Real Exchange Rate US and 
Colombia, Price estimates of gram 
of cocaine for sales under 2 grams 
Central Bank of Colombia, IMF, DEA 
STRIDE Database—RAND Corporation 
Price of cocaine 
substitute 
Price estimates of 
methamphetamine, sales under ten 
grams, Alcohol Price Index 
DEA STRIDE Database—RAND 
Corporation, BLS 
Rainfall in Colombia Rainfall in coca growing regions 
in Colombia 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Association (NOAA)-NCDC 
Cocaine users income Median Income US US Census Bureau 
Cocaine user population Estimate of cocaine initiates in the 
US 
NSDUH, DHH  
Productivity in 
Colombia 
Productivity index of industrial 
firms in Colombia 
Colombian Bureau of National Statistics 
Colombian Corruption  Errors and Omissions, Colombia 
Balance of Payments 
Central Bank of Colombia, IMF 
Table 1 
IV.  Analysis  
 Available data to test the theoretical model proposed by this paper was analyzed 
using OLS in four different ways.  The variables that were available to estimate the price 
of cocaine were analyzed with against a single measure of the price of a cocaine 
substitute, and this analysis was repeated using the other measure available to measure 
the price of a cocaine substitute.  This was first done in pure level terms, and the results 
of this analysis are below: 
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OLS Analysis of Regressions in level terms 
Number of 
Observations: 107 Price estimate by DEA used for price of cocaine estimate Real exchange rate used for price of cocaine estimate 
Regressed against 
cocaine seizure data 
Price estimate of 
methamphetamine used for 
price of cocaine substitute 
Price of alcohol used for price of 
cocaine substitute 
Price estimate of 
methamphetamine used for 
price of cocaine substitute 
Price of alcohol used for price 
of cocaine substitute 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
C 40012.1223 2.439   41741.2313 1.440  40557.2729 3.067   45363.2982 1.707   
Cocaine Initiate 
Population (-1) -0.0379 -2.641 *** -0.0371 -2.591 *** -0.0243 -2.124 ** -0.0249 -2.173 ** 
Colombian 
Corruption -29316.5818 -2.404 *** -28930.9169 -2.331 *** -19645.4947 -1.718 ** -18542.2746 -1.603 * 
Colombian 
Productivity -47.0998 -0.886   -51.0358 -0.963   0.2269 0.005   -3.9270 -0.078   
DEA operating 
budget as percentage 
of budget of USDOJ -289132.5572 -1.725 ** -275518.5235 -1.613 * -231701.0477 -1.494 * -210182.8069 -1.334 * 
Activity of Other Law 
Enforcement 
Agencies -9230058.0965 -8.876 *** -9160678.4050 -8.518 *** -7321550.7774 -6.896 *** -7202896.8207 -6.554 *** 
Rainfall in Columbia 0.0108 0.035   0.0153 0.049  0.0747 0.261   0.0797 0.278   
Resources aimed at 
US Corruption -7583253.4873 -1.958 ** -8166926.0077 -1.708 ** -9150983.4475 -2.551 *** -9169699.3440 -2.081 ** 
US Median Income 0.6603 1.623 * 0.5743 1.344 * -0.0193 -0.052   -0.1082 -0.260   
Time 238.0319 4.605 *** 242.6895 1.050   266.2711 5.549 *** 313.8575 1.489 * 
Real Exchange Rate XXXXX XXXXX 1012538.8957 4.144 *** 1024041.8496 4.192 *** 
Price estimate of 
cocaine -3.8288 -0.486   -5.6401 -0.760   XXXXX XXXXX 
Price estimate of 
methamphetamine -3.0049 -0.612   XXXXX -2.6821 -0.635   XXXXX 
Price of alcohol XXXXX 8.7839 0.042   XXXXX -31.2516 -0.164   
R-Squared 0.810366 0.809623 0.839003 0.838365 
Table 2 
*=Significant at 10% confidence level 
**=Significant at 5% confidence level 
***=Significant at 1% confidence level
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In all four regressions the cocaine user population proxy, the measure of resources 
available to the DEA, the Columbian corruption measure, and the drug enforcement 
activity of other law enforcing activities were all found to have a significant negative 
impact on cocaine seizures.  The variable measuring corruption in the United States was 
found to be significant, but have negative impacts on cocaine seizures when analyzed in 
the different regressions.  When applied, changes in the real exchange rate were found to 
a positive significant impact on cocaine seizures.  Changes in the median income of the 
US were found to have a significant positive impact on cocaine seizures when analyzed 
in two of the regressions. 
Some of the signs of these significant variables were expected and consistent with 
the proposed theoretical model.  The real exchange rate of Colombian pesos to US dollars 
was found to have a positive impact on the amount of cocaine seizures.  This suggests 
when the dollar appreciates against the Colombian peso cocaine is relatively cheap in the 
US, and cocaine seizures would increase due to the prevalence of cocaine on the market.  
It was also expected for the variables that measured Colombian corruption and the 
activities of other law enforcement agencies to have negative coefficients.  This would 
imply that as Colombian corruption and the activities of other law enforcement agencies 
would ultimately reduce the total volume of cocaine seized solely by the DEA.  Similarly 
that the variable that estimated the income of cocaine users had a positive coefficient is 
consistent with the proposed theoretical model—as the income of users goes up, the 
amount of cocaine on the market would increase, and more cocaine would be seized. 
Surprisingly the variable which measured the cocaine user population’s size had a 
negative coefficient.  On the outset this would suggest as the cocaine user population 
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increases, the total volume of seizures made by the DEA goes down, which might imply 
one of several things.  It suggests that a large user population might manage to hide the 
cocaine on the market.  Or it might imply that a larger population quickly consumes more 
of the cocaine brought on the market leaving less available for the DEA to seize.  Both of 
these scenarios seem unlikely.  In this situation, what might be getting observed is a 
reverse relationship.  That is, when more cocaine is seized more people are inclined to 
mot use the drug.  It is also hard to believe that as the amount of resources the DEA is 
given as a percentage of the overall department of justice increases, the quantity of 
cocaine seizures would go down.  Additionally, the variable that measures expenditures 
fighting corruption in the US should not be negative.  As this variable increases, the OIG 
of the USDOJ should have more money relative to the budgets of the entries USDOJ to 
pursue corruption within domestic law enforcement activates.  Hypothetically, as more 
resources were devoted to this area, the amount of corruption in the US should go down, 
and more cocaine seizures should be made.  This result is very puzzling. 
Notably, the measure for the activities of other law enforcement agencies was also 
negative and significant in all four regressions.  This suggests that as other law 
enforcement agencies enforce drug laws, there is less cocaine for the DEA to seize.  Also 
if these agencies are seizing cocaine, the DEA will be seizing less cocaine as a result of 
only its own actions.  The STRIDE database, however, is composed of data contributions 
form the DEA and another law enforcement agency.  This result is more surprising than it 
might initially seem.  
It was later noted that interpreting the amount of economic significance of a 
particular variable was hard to observe using these regressions.  For instance, this 
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analysis suggests that as net errors and omissions of Colombia’s capital account becomes 
a larger absolute percent of total Colombian exports, fewer kilograms of cocaine are 
seized by the DEA.  This is not a particularly meaningful observation, and it is also a 
mouthful.  These regressions were therefore reanalyzed so that the coefficient estimates 
would be expressed as elasticity’s.  The results of this method of analysis are below: 
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OLS Analysis of Regressions as elasticity’s 
Number of 
Observations: 77 Price estimate by DEA used for price of cocaine estimate Real exchange rate used for price of cocaine estimate 
Regressed against 
cocaine seizure data 
Price estimate of 
methamphetamine used for 
price of cocaine substitute 
Price of alcohol used for 
price of cocaine substitute 
Price estimate of 
methamphetamine used for 
price of cocaine substitute 
Price of alcohol used for 
price of cocaine substitute 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
C -8.7381 -0.554   -29.1249 -1.747  -9.6596 -0.625   -24.4524 -1.420   
Cocaine Initiate 
Population (-1) 0.2906 1.113   0.2177 0.874   -0.0996 -0.332   -0.0001 0.000   
Colombian 
Corruption -0.0433 -2.361 ** -0.0442 -2.548 ** -0.0326 -1.755 ** -0.0375 -2.048 ** 
Colombian 




budget of USDOJ 0.4132 1.132   0.1586 0.441  0.2444 0.705   0.0630 0.178   
Activity of Other 
Law Enforcement 
Agencies -3.0841 -7.593 *** -2.9521 -7.599 *** -2.5329 -5.596 *** -2.6453 -6.092 *** 
Rainfall in Columbia 0.0188 0.311   0.0315 0.549   0.0207 0.350   0.0283 0.490   
Resources aimed at 
US Corruption -0.2341 -1.010   -0.5210 -2.259 ** -0.3837 -1.638 * -0.5701 -2.424 *** 
US Median Income -0.5920 -0.369   -0.4971 -0.352   0.4838 0.299   0.0257 0.018   
Time 0.9798 3.499 *** -1.0202 -1.286   0.7714 2.817 *** -0.7511 -0.894   
Real Exchange Rate XXXXX XXXXX 0.8530 2.723 *** 0.5420 1.705 ** 
Price estimate of 
cocaine 0.3170 2.104 ** 0.2740 1.947 ** XXXXX XXXXX 
Price estimate of 
methamphetamine -0.0843 -0.844   XXXXX -0.1066 -1.079   XXXXX 
Price of alcohol XXXXX 5.1248 2.800 *** XXXXX 4.1267 2.101 *** 
R-Squared 0.69415 0.724079 0.706763065 0.720488282 
Table 3 
*=Significant at 10% confidence level 
**=Significant at 5% confidence level 
***=Significant at 1% confidence level 
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Here, the measure of the activity of other drug enforcement agencies, and the 
Columbian corruption measure both have a significant negative impact on cocaine 
seizures.  In three out of the four regressions the measure for resources aimed at 
combating corruption in the US was also found to have a significant negative impact on 
cocaine seizures.  When applied, changes in the real exchange rate, changes in the price 
estimate generated by the DEA’s STRIDE database, and changes in the alcohol price 
index were found to have a positive significant impact on cocaine seizures. 
That changes in the price estimate of cocaine generated by the DEA would have a 
positive impact on cocaine seizures is puzzling.  As the price of cocaine increases, one 
would expect there to be less demand for cocaine on the market, and less cocaine for the 
DEA to seize.  Perhaps what is getting observed in this regression is another reverse 
relationship, as was described previously.  Perhaps as the DEA seizes more cocaine, the 
price of cocaine increases as there is a reduced supply of cocaine on the market.  Yet is 
not clear whether the DEA’s operations significantly affect cocaine prices throughout the 
US, so this seems to be an overly optimistic assessment.  Another possibility is that this 
price increase is a result of an increase in demand for cocaine, which is in turn inspired 
by an increase in seizures.  More individuals may wish to purchase cocaine for later 
recreational use if they perceive it will be harder to get in the future.  More interestingly, 
the analysis suggests that changes in the real exchange rate have a greater impact on the 
amount of cocaine seized by the DEA then changes in the price estimate of cocaine. 
Perhaps the most unexpected result from this analysis is the tremendous positive 
impact that changes in the price of alcohol have on cocaine seizures.  It would seem from 
this analysis that alcohol is tremendous substitute for cocaine, as when the price of 
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alcohol increases the number of cocaine seizures is positively impacted.  That is, as the 
price of alcohol goes up more people are more likely to use cocaine, which then gets 
seized by the DEA.   
I found it interesting that the elasticity for the price estimate of methamphetamine 
was negative.  This would suggest that methamphetamine is a compliment to cocaine, not 
a substitute. Out of sheer curiosity, I reran these regressions running both the price of 
alcohol and price of methamphetamine variables, against the price of cocaine estimate 
generated by the DEA and the real exchange rate.  I assumed, that methamphetamine 
might be a compliment to cocaine. The results are below: 
Analysis of Data inspired regressions as elasticity’s 
Number of 
Observations: 77 Price estimate by DEA used 
for price of cocaine 
estimate 
Real exchange rate used 





Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
C -51.0394 -2.736  -43.6361 -2.277   
Cocaine Initiate 
Population (-1) 0.1171 0.479   -0.1131 -0.395   
Colombian 
Corruption -0.0490 -2.898 *** -0.0412 -2.297 ** 
Colombian 




budget of USDOJ -0.0136 -0.038   -0.1160 -0.327   
Activity of Other 
Law Enforcement 
Agencies -2.7974 -7.331 *** -2.4732 -5.731 *** 
Price estimate of 
methamphetamine -0.2362 -2.337 ** -0.2107 -2.080 ** 
Price of alcohol 7.0224 3.605 *** 5.7184 2.772 *** 
Rainfall in 
Columbia 0.0316 0.568   0.0272 0.483   
Resources aimed 
at US Corruption -0.4807 -2.148 ** -0.5386 -2.342 ** 
US Median Income 1.2800 0.819   1.6897 1.054   
Time -2.1938 -2.392 *** -1.7837 -1.862 ** 
Real Exchange 
Rate XXXXX 0.6043 1.940 ** 
Price estimate of 
cocaine 0.3331 2.406 *** XXXXX 
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R-Squared 0.745779 0.738192 
Table 4 
*=Significant at 10% confidence level 
**=Significant at 5% confidence level 
***=Significant at 1% confidence level 
 These regressions are interesting.  The measure of the activity of other drug 
enforcement agencies, the US corruption measure, and the Columbian corruption 
measure still have significant negative impacts on cocaine seizures.  Also, when the price 
estimate of cocaine generated by the DEA STRIDE data and the real exchange rate 
variables are applied to the regressions, both are found to have a significant positive 
impact on cocaine seizures.  Here though, both the price of alcohol and the price estimate 
of methamphetamine are found to be significant, and the signs of these variables are the 
same observed in the previous analysis.   
It was suggested that the theoretical model might be an overidentified equation.  
Specifically, it was questioned as to whether or not the price of cocaine variable was truly 
exogenous, as the proposed seizure model incorporates the total volume of cocaine traded 
on the market, and fluctuations in the quantity of cocaine traded effects cocaine price. 
The cocaine price variable may therefore already be defined within the model.  To test 
this critique, I ran a Hausman Test for overidentifying restrictions.  First, I ran a two 
staged least squares analysis of my regression.  I used the real exchange rate as an 
instrument for the price of cocaine, and used the other variables of the regression as 
instruments for the purposes of analysis.  The results of this are below: 
First Stage of Hausman Test 
Number of Observations: 77   
Regressed against cocaine 
seizure data Coefficient t-Statistic 
C -49.49342118 -2.56185 
Cocaine Initiate Population (-
1) 0.165006927 0.652909 
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Colombian Corruption -0.051580276 -2.94975 
Colombian Productivity -0.133667775 -0.3534 
DEA operating budget as 
percentage of budget of 
USDOJ -0.20012661 -0.55628 
Activity of Other Law 
Enforcement Agencies -2.844881693 -7.20501 
Price estimate of 
methamphetamine -0.191826254 -1.86326 
Price of alcohol 6.871058357 3.406173 
Rainfall in Columbia 0.020845629 0.363031 
Resources aimed at US 
Corruption -0.467864622 -2.0183 
US Median Income 1.224158256 0.75621 
Time -2.224783286 -2.34137 
Table 5-a 
I then regressed the residuals from this regression, against the instruments used in the 
first stage of this test. The results of this are below: 
Second Stage of Hausman Test 
Number of Observations: 77   
Regressed against residuals of 
first stage of Hausman test Coefficient t-Statistic 
C 5.857342524 0.305697 
Cocaine Initiate Population (-
1) -0.278088569 -0.97225 
Colombian Corruption 0.010368162 0.577923 
Colombian Productivity 0.272882999 0.688668 
DEA operating budget as 
percentage of budget of 
USDOJ 0.084110626 0.236928 
Activity of Other Law 
Enforcement Agencies 0.371637793 0.861163 
Real Exchange Rate 0.604327797 1.940125 
Price estimate of 
methamphetamine -0.018912272 -0.18669 
Price of alcohol -1.152635347 -0.5587 
Rainfall in Columbia 0.006387249 0.113382 
Resources aimed at US 
Corruption -0.070691667 -0.30744 
US Median Income 0.465554269 0.290336 
Time 0.441082595 0.460424 
R-squared 0.055546893 
Table 5-b 
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The test statistic of this regression (n*R
2
=77*0.055547= 4.27711) is distributed chi-
squared asymptotically with degrees of freedom equal to the number of instruments in 
excess of the number of troublesome variables (12-1=11).  The chi-squared statistic at the 
5% level is 19.68, so I accept the null hypothesis that the extra instruments are valid.  It 
should be noted, however, that the Hausman test suffers from considerable size 
distortions in small samples, and is not always useful when analyzing small samples 
(Murray 2006).  
 As can be observed when analyzing these regressions in the appendix, all of the 
regressions display some evidence of serial correlation.  Further examination of the 
residuals, also in the appendix, explains that this evidence is for the most part a result of 
how the data was constructed.  By transforming annual data into quarterly observations, 
the residuals of the regression vary dramatically once every four periods, or once 
whenever there is an actual change in the real data.  While future work will hopefully 
allow access to real observations, attempts can also be made to smooth the estimates of 
these changes from period to period.  For instance an average of two years can be applied 
to the fourth and first periods between a year’s worth of data allowing for more variation 
throughout the data. 
 When examining these same regressions using annual versions of the data, there 
is little evidence of serial correlation.  In these circumstances there is very little evidence 
of serial correlation.  Interestingly, these regressions which use annual data, suggest some 
of the same relationships noted in the previously described regressions.  Tables 
summarizing these regressions are below: 
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OLS Analysis of Regressions as elasticity’s 
Number of Observations: 19 Real exchange rate used for price of cocaine estimate Price estimate by DEA used for price of cocaine estimate 
Regressed against cocaine 
seizure data 
Price estimate of 
methamphetamine used for price of 
cocaine substitute 
Price of alcohol used for price of 
cocaine substitute 
Price estimate of 
methamphetamine used for 
price of cocaine substitute 
Price of alcohol used for price of 
cocaine substitute 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
C 44.5697 1.472  0.2976 0.005  25.6832 0.512  -57.5339 -0.999  
Cocaine Initiate Population (-1) 0.6946 1.142  0.1815 0.279  0.6001 0.612  0.3288 0.517  
Colombian Corruption 0.0109 0.198  -0.0724 -1.248  -0.0639 -0.856  -0.1062 -1.984 ** 
Colombian Productivity 1.3769 1.734 * 1.0988 1.137  0.6536 0.585  0.8393 0.898  
DEA operating budget as 
percentage of budget of 
USDOJ 1.7716 2.182 ** 0.5776 0.651  1.2386 1.052  0.3946 0.445  
Activity of Other Law 
Enforcement Agencies 0.2399 0.173  -1.8445 -1.646 * -2.7585 -1.455 * -2.9784 -2.865 ** 
Rainfall in Columbia 1.4505 2.942 ** 1.5529 2.263  1.1571 1.436 * 1.5516 2.201 ** 
Resources aimed at US 
Corruption -0.2633 -0.519  -0.9628 -1.655 * -0.5520 -0.725  -1.1718 -1.992 ** 
US Median Income -4.2650 -1.284  -3.6512 -0.906  -5.3614 -1.057  -2.9566 -0.695  
Time -0.2556 -0.371  -1.3367 -0.373  1.0003 1.043  -4.4613 -1.358  
Real Exchange Rate -2.0952 -3.359 *** -1.5303 -1.831 * XXXXX XXXXX 
Price estimate of cocaine XXXXX XXXXX 0.6745 1.201  0.7660 1.710 * 
Price estimate of 
methamphetamine -0.4923 -1.936 * XXXXX -0.1219 -0.321  XXXXX 
Price of alcohol XXXXX 4.7420 0.592  XXXXX 12.5143 1.756 * 
R-squared 0.924606995 0.889761551 0.836768162 0.885009385 
Table 7 
*=Significant at 10% confidence level 
**=Significant at 5% confidence level 
***=Significant at 1% confidence level 
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Analysis of Data inspired regressions as elasticity’s 
Number of Observations: 19 
Price estimate by DEA used for 
price of cocaine estimate  
Real exchange rate used for 
price of cocaine estimate  
Regressed against cocaine seizure 
data Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
C -49.8342 -0.814  15.0105 0.309  
Cocaine Initiate Population (-1) 0.6895 0.802  0.7844 1.234  
Colombian Corruption -0.0827 -1.248  -0.0059 -0.098  
Colombian Productivity 0.7745 0.790  1.2726 1.540 * 
DEA operating budget as 
percentage of budget of USDOJ 0.7458 0.698  1.5108 1.685 * 
Activity of Other Law Enforcement 
Agencies -2.1160 -1.246  0.2042 0.143  
Price estimate of 
methamphetamine -0.2225 -0.659  -0.5028 -1.922 ** 
Price of alcohol 13.3515 1.770 * 5.4070 0.793  
Rainfall in Columbia 1.7017 2.211 ** 1.6860 2.871 ** 
Resources aimed at US Corruption -0.9460 -1.346  -0.4368 -0.773  
US Median Income -3.6174 -0.795  -4.0103 -1.170  
Time -5.2720 -1.448 * -2.6711 -0.854  
Real Exchange Rate XXXXX  -1.8240 -2.511 ** 
Price estimate of cocaine 0.6651 1.353  XXXXX  
R-squared 0.892779501  0.93175983  
Table 7 
*=Significant at 10% confidence level 
**=Significant at 5% confidence level 
***=Significant at 1% confidence level 
Notably, when the real exchange rate was applied to the model this variable was 
consistently found to be significant, though these regressions suggest as the real exchange 
rate increase (becomes more favorable for the United States) the amount of cocaine 
seized goes down, which is inconsistent with the previous regressions and the theory 
proposed by this paper.  More data and analysis is needed to truly determine what the 
impact of this variable is on cocaine seizures.  
 The correlation matrices included in the appendix present troubling data which 
also suggest flaws with this analysis.  These matrices show that many of the variables, 
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even in their unaltered annual form, are correlated with one another.  Perhaps more real 
non-estimated data will eliminate this issue.  But, the incorrect larger standard errors that 
may be generated as a result of these variables relationship may result in the incorrect 
conclusion that a variable in this proposed model is significant. 
This analysis is most severely complicated by the weakness of the data that was 
applied to the regression.  The process by which the data was cleaned so that the 
relationships between all of these variables could be analyzed leaves much to be desired.  
There are no independent observations of quarterly cocaine seizures, resources available 
to the DEA, resources available to the OIG, the size of the cocaine initiate population, 
and the activities of other law enforcement agencies that can be immediately applied to 
this model.  This is not to say that this model is worthless.  Given all these weaknesses 
the model accounts for over 69% of the variation in the data, every time it was run with 
the available data.  But, the results presented in this paper leave much to be desired if one 
was to make an assertion regarding how the DEA might consider investing its resources 
if it would like to increase the amount of cocaine it seizes.   
  Analysis of the regression, however, does suggest that some aspects of the 
proposed model are weak or require further investigation.  For instance it is clear that 
variations in rainfall in coca growing regions in Colombia might not be the best measure 
of coca production, or reflect the amount of cocaine produced in a given year.  Future 
study of cocaine seizures might instead incorporate data regarding the price of the 
chemicals required to transform coca leaves into cocaine base and precipitated cocaine 
crystals.  If data regarding the price of these goods could be developed into a price index 
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that could be readily applied to a model that analyzes seizures, this might significantly 
estimate how much cocaine is produced in a given time period in Colombia.   
It is also not clear what the impact changes in income in the United States and 
productivity in Colombia have on cocaine seizures made by the DEA.  A better measure 
of income in the United States might look at the median income of specific groups that 
report to use cocaine more frequently than other segments of society.  A better measure 
of the economic standing of Colombian citizens would also be useful to this model.  As 
this paper discussed previously low economic periods in Colombia are often associated 
with more corruption.  A measure of Colombian income might be useful to understand 
whether or not individuals would feel motivated to participate in the illicit cocaine 
market.   
The significance and the strength of the relationship between the real exchange 
rate of the Colombian peso and US dollar suggested in the regressions is interesting.  
While there is not enough information here to suggest that this variable could be used as a 
proxy for the price of cocaine, the relationship presented here deserves further 
exploration, and suggests that this exogenous variable might be useful to the DEA.  The 
reason that the real exchange rate displays any type of relationship with cocaine seizures 
cannot be fully explained by the analysis in this paper.  Fluctuations in the real exchange 
rate variable might be reflecting fluctuations in the strength of the Colombian economy, 
something this paper previously showed impacted the amount of coca and cocaine 
produced in Colombia.  Though this would still suggest that this variable would be useful 
for the DEA in analyzing the trends of the cocaine industry, it would also suggest that 
this instrument may not be measuring fluctuations in the price of cocaine. 
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V.  Conclusions 
 Empirical analysis of the model proposed in this paper is inconclusive given the 
weakness of the data the analysis is based on.  Yet it is clear that there are strengths 
within the model proposed.  Various variables in the model that are significant are also 
interesting for purposes of continuing the recent evaluation of the STRIDE database, and 
perhaps might shift the focus of this debate.  It would seem that it might be valuable for 
the DEA to appreciate the intricacies of the illicit cocaine market, and devote more 
energy understanding which variables it should analyze so that allow it might recognize 
whether or not there will be more cocaine on the market.   While the DEA may be unable 
to collect accurate information regarding the street price of cocaine, the agency will be 
able to continue to record how much cocaine it has seized throughout a year.  
Recognizing why this might be, and understanding the tools available that might indicate 
the general nature of the market should help the DEA accomplish its goal of 
understanding the trends of the market for cocaine itself. 
 The DEA might also consider developing a strategy for strengthening the 
Colombian economy, if their goal is to reduce the amount of cocaine available to US 
citizens.  While the theoretical model employed in this paper has not been tested fully, 
these initial results strongly suggest that the economic situation of Colombia significantly 
effects how much cocaine will be on the market.  Establishing a firm trade relationship 
and developing policies that support Colombian industries may have a much greater long 
term impact on the total amount of cocaine that is traded on the illicit market, then the 
DEA’s current practices. 
 





ALCP=Price of alcohol 
CSKGS=Cocaine seizures in kilograms 
COLCOR=Columbian Corruption (Errors and Omissions as percentage of exports) 
COLPRO=Colombian Productivity 
DEAOBAP=DEA Operating Budget as Percentage of Budget of Department of Justice 
OLE=Activity of other drug law enforcement agencies (DUI arrests per capita) 
PCOC=Price of Cocaine (STRIDE Estimate) 
PMETH=Price of Methamphetamine (STRIDE Estimate) 
RX =Real Exchange Rate Columbian peso to US dollar 
RF=Rainfall in Colombia 
USCOR=Resources aimed at US Corruption (Operating budget of Office of Inspector General as 
percentage of Budget of Department of Justice) 
USINC= US Median Income 
COCIP=Cocaine initiate population estimate of US 
T=Time 
Means, Standard Deviations, Max, and Min of Selected Variables  
 Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Max Min 
ALCP 148.8367 34.69370342 210.18 90.8 
COCIP 263657.4 61724.90024 415000 158750 
COLCOR 0.032253 0.032016439 0.187836 0.000112 
COLPRO 95.75152 18.61539948 145.8638 60.0993 
CSKGS 13232.2 7577.094024 29577.75 399.2747 
DEAOBAP 0.020341 0.003234539 0.029206 0.015243 
OLE 0.004705 0.000521515 0.005682 0.003916 
PCOC 224.8819 137.1932918 669.05 87.57 
PMETH 261.2619 110.3787502 580.08 101.54 
RF 3033.632 1150.057472 5565 661 
RX 0.009428 0.001973025 0.012689 0.005634 
USCOR 0.000419 0.000286104 0.000811 0 
USINC 45192.15 2854.907547 50233 40182 





Correlation Matrix Annual Data 
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary             
Date: 04/26/09   Time: 22:44             
Sample (adjusted): 1989 2007             
Included observations: 19 after adjustments            
Balanced sample (listwise missing value deletion)           
               
               
Correlation LALCP LCOCIP LCOLCOR LCOLPRO LCSKGS LDEAOBAP LOLE LPCOC LPMETH LRF LRX LT LUSCOR LUSINC 
LALCP  1.000000              
LCOCIP  0.326072 1.000000             
LCOLCOR  -0.382669 -0.458592 1.000000            
LCOLPRO  0.834354 0.076929 -0.303021 1.000000           
LCSKGS  0.319370 -0.067480 -0.104337 0.196832 1.000000          
LDEAOBAP  0.581897 -0.101292 -0.246032 0.541807 0.519878 1.000000         
LOLE  0.481497 0.554182 -0.363226 0.405733 -0.472843 -0.165331 1.000000        
LPCOC  -0.680176 -0.099723 0.227604 -0.764921 -0.075440 -0.660884 -0.209948 1.000000       
LPMETH  -0.619858 -0.337808 0.423757 -0.562871 -0.350735 -0.208423 -0.261394 0.336394 1.000000      
LRF  0.507485 0.415240 -0.225508 0.444898 0.130487 0.142789 0.540371 -0.222935 -0.358053 1.000000     
LRX  0.343762 0.203214 -0.151094 0.525563 -0.579149 0.010417 0.732978 -0.392073 -0.265321 0.452602 1.000000    
LT  0.991887 0.403325 -0.408374 0.823797 0.256047 0.514961 0.564205 -0.652543 -0.635364 0.564214 0.408455 1.000000   
LUSCOR  0.529614 -0.426500 -0.203532 0.535442 0.460707 0.680620 -0.240973 -0.491319 -0.254253 0.032284 -0.118539 0.438329 1.000000  
LUSINC  0.742289 0.726513 -0.481538 0.581302 0.061865 0.345257 0.645832 -0.500511 -0.457980 0.618539 0.471929 0.799190 -0.009792 1.000000 
               
















Correlation Matrix Quarterly Data 
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary             
Date: 04/26/09   Time: 22:44             
Sample (adjusted): 1988Q4 2007Q4             
Included observations: 77 after adjustments            
Balanced sample (listwise missing value deletion)           
               
               
Correlation LALCP LCOCIP LCOLCOR LCOLPRO LCSKGS LDEAOBAP LOLE LPCOC LPMETH LRF LRX LT LUSCOR LUSINC 
LALCP  1.000000              
LCOCIP  0.279049 1.000000             
LCOLCOR  -0.256064 -0.107009 1.000000            
LCOLPRO  0.736181 -0.037774 -0.293602 1.000000           
LCSKGS  0.322154 -0.066889 -0.211460 0.282738 1.000000          
LDEAOBAP  0.563870 -0.065891 -0.201182 0.626561 0.485969 1.000000         
LOLE  0.485669 0.532975 -0.147330 0.227517 -0.471211 -0.120267 1.000000        
LPCOC  -0.685464 -0.103970 0.136136 -0.561759 -0.143190 -0.535851 -0.286444 1.000000       
LPMETH  -0.619623 -0.179809 0.082031 -0.392754 -0.247225 -0.304877 -0.292787 0.547148 1.000000      
LRF  0.122588 0.093306 -0.174715 0.276031 0.021633 0.037952 0.127705 -0.127564 -0.052758 1.000000     
LRX  -0.344157 -0.000359 -0.061791 -0.421734 0.426593 -0.104993 -0.602938 0.417162 0.298440 -0.170812 1.000000    
LT  0.990080 0.346651 -0.249329 0.711789 0.246041 0.501661 0.565444 -0.678042 -0.644871 0.140114 -0.404901 1.000000   
LUSCOR  0.533669 -0.406272 -0.241850 0.580422 0.482639 0.618814 -0.247325 -0.405260 -0.289874 -0.008711 0.066188 0.449040 1.000000  
LUSINC  0.747757 0.699133 -0.140102 0.446090 0.061734 0.339221 0.648447 -0.480764 -0.358207 0.162717 -0.366936 0.792866 0.025770 1.000000 
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Regressions in Table 2 
Real exchange rate used for price of cocaine estimate—Price of alcohol used for price of cocaine 
substitute 
Dependent Variable: CSKGS   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 02/26/09   Time: 00:49   
Sample (adjusted): 1981Q2 2007Q4  
Included observations: 107 after adjustments  
     
     
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 45363.30 26570.10 1.707306 0.0910 
COCIP(-1) -0.024932 0.011476 -2.172572 0.0323 
COLCOR -18542.27 11568.61 -1.602809 0.1123 
COLPRO -3.927001 50.13023 -0.078336 0.9377 
DEAOBAP -210182.8 157535.9 -1.334190 0.1853 
OLE -7202897. 1099049. -6.553754 0.0000 
RX 1024042. 244285.8 4.191983 0.0001 
ALCP -31.25162 190.6393 -0.163931 0.8701 
RF 0.079698 0.287058 0.277636 0.7819 
USCOR -9169699. 4406021. -2.081175 0.0401 
USINC -0.108247 0.415693 -0.260402 0.7951 
T 313.8575 210.7522 1.489225 0.1397 
     
     
R-squared 0.838365     Mean dependent var 13352.14 
Adjusted R-squared 0.819649     S.D. dependent var 7509.050 
S.E. of regression 3188.924     Akaike info criterion 19.07810 
Sum squared resid 9.66E+08     Schwarz criterion 19.37786 
Log likelihood -1008.678     Hannan-Quinn criter. 19.19962 
F-statistic 44.79483     Durbin-Watson stat 0.631056 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Real exchange rate used for price of cocaine estimate—Price estimate of methamphetamine 
used for price of cocaine substitute 
Dependent Variable: CSKGS   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/04/09   Time: 00:42   
Sample (adjusted): 1981Q2 2007Q4  
Included observations: 107 after adjustments  
     
     
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 40557.27 13224.41 3.066850 0.0028 
COCIP(-1) -0.024255 0.011417 -2.124355 0.0362 
COLCOR -19645.49 11435.08 -1.718002 0.0891 
COLPRO 0.226856 50.32693 0.004508 0.9964 
DEAOBAP -231701.0 155072.7 -1.494144 0.1385 
OLE -7321551. 1061684. -6.896166 0.0000 
 Klebanoff 36 
 
RX 1012539. 244316.2 4.144378 0.0001 
PMETH -2.682079 4.222225 -0.635229 0.5268 
RF 0.074733 0.286287 0.261042 0.7946 
USCOR -9150983. 3586627. -2.551418 0.0123 
USINC -0.019264 0.367926 -0.052358 0.9584 
T 266.2711 47.98958 5.548519 0.0000 
     
     
R-squared 0.839003     Mean dependent var 13352.14 
Adjusted R-squared 0.820361     S.D. dependent var 7509.050 
S.E. of regression 3182.623     Akaike info criterion 19.07415 
Sum squared resid 9.62E+08     Schwarz criterion 19.37390 
Log likelihood -1008.467     Hannan-Quinn criter. 19.19566 
F-statistic 45.00661     Durbin-Watson stat 0.629596 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Price estimate by DEA used for price of cocaine estimate—Price estimate of methamphetamine 
used for price of cocaine substitute 
Dependent Variable: CSKGS   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/04/09   Time: 00:42   
Sample (adjusted): 1981Q2 2007Q4  
Included observations: 107 after adjustments  
     
     
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 40012.12 16406.96 2.438728 0.0166 
COCIP(-1) -0.037853 0.014333 -2.640933 0.0097 
COLCOR -29316.58 12194.97 -2.403989 0.0182 
COLPRO -47.09984 53.18545 -0.885578 0.3781 
DEAOBAP -289132.6 167618.6 -1.724943 0.0878 
OLE -9230058. 1039855. -8.876294 0.0000 
PCOC -3.828785 7.884766 -0.485593 0.6284 
PMETH -3.004859 4.913548 -0.611546 0.5423 
RF 0.010815 0.310643 0.034813 0.9723 
USCOR -7583253. 3872193. -1.958387 0.0531 
USINC 0.660268 0.406869 1.622802 0.1079 
T 238.0319 51.69078 4.604920 0.0000 
     
     
R-squared 0.810366     Mean dependent var 13352.14 
Adjusted R-squared 0.788408     S.D. dependent var 7509.050 
S.E. of regression 3454.099     Akaike info criterion 19.23786 
Sum squared resid 1.13E+09     Schwarz criterion 19.53761 
Log likelihood -1017.225     Hannan-Quinn criter. 19.35938 
F-statistic 36.90580     Durbin-Watson stat 0.562712 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Price estimate by DEA used for price of cocaine estimate—Price of alcohol used for price of 
cocaine substitute 
Dependent Variable: CSKGS   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/04/09   Time: 00:43   
Sample (adjusted): 1981Q2 2007Q4  
Included observations: 107 after adjustments  
     
     
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 41741.23 28989.07 1.439895 0.1532 
COCIP(-1) -0.037082 0.014315 -2.590543 0.0111 
COLCOR -28930.92 12411.17 -2.331039 0.0219 
COLPRO -51.03582 52.97246 -0.963441 0.3378 
DEAOBAP -275518.5 170798.9 -1.613116 0.1100 
OLE -9160678. 1075507. -8.517548 0.0000 
PCOC -5.640076 7.424707 -0.759636 0.4494 
ALCP 8.783880 208.9348 0.042041 0.9666 
RF 0.015253 0.311581 0.048952 0.9611 
USCOR -8166926. 4780182. -1.708497 0.0908 
USINC 0.574296 0.427406 1.343679 0.1823 
T 242.6895 231.2380 1.049523 0.2966 
     
     
R-squared 0.809623     Mean dependent var 13352.14 
Adjusted R-squared 0.787579     S.D. dependent var 7509.050 
S.E. of regression 3460.859     Akaike info criterion 19.24177 
Sum squared resid 1.14E+09     Schwarz criterion 19.54152 
Log likelihood -1017.435     Hannan-Quinn criter. 19.36329 
F-statistic 36.72806     Durbin-Watson stat 0.558705 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Regressions in Table 3 
Real exchange rate used for price of cocaine estimate—Price of alcohol used for price of cocaine 
substitute 
Dependent Variable: LCSKGS   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/04/09   Time: 01:05   
Sample (adjusted): 1988Q4 2007Q4  
Included observations: 77 after adjustments  
     
     
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -24.49244 17.07991 -1.433991 0.1563 
LCOCIP(-1) 0.000459 0.285612 0.001607 0.9987 
LCOLCOR -0.037238 0.017805 -2.091407 0.0403 
LDEAOBAP 0.058649 0.344616 0.170186 0.8654 
LOLE -2.641049 0.426439 -6.193265 0.0000 
LRX 0.549435 0.296200 1.854947 0.0681 
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LALCP 4.109932 1.934248 2.124821 0.0374 
LRF 0.027140 0.054871 0.494613 0.6225 
LUSCOR -0.571990 0.231904 -2.466493 0.0162 
LUSINC 0.027495 1.413885 0.019447 0.9845 
LT -0.748739 0.833031 -0.898814 0.3720 
     
     
R-squared 0.720468     Mean dependent var 9.636644 
Adjusted R-squared 0.678115     S.D. dependent var 0.370900 
S.E. of regression 0.210430     Akaike info criterion -0.147767 
Sum squared resid 2.922522     Schwarz criterion 0.187062 
Log likelihood 16.68904     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.013838 
F-statistic 17.01092     Durbin-Watson stat 0.606241 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Real exchange rate used for price of cocaine estimate—Price estimate of methamphetamine 
used for price of cocaine substitute 
Dependent Variable: LCSKGS   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/04/09   Time: 01:06   
Sample (adjusted): 1988Q4 2007Q4  
Included observations: 77 after adjustments  
     
     
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -8.329762 15.06949 -0.552757 0.5823 
LCOCIP(-1) -0.098287 0.298465 -0.329309 0.7430 
LCOLCOR -0.033916 0.018175 -1.866129 0.0665 
LDEAOBAP 0.282829 0.333505 0.848051 0.3995 
LOLE -2.568508 0.442501 -5.804532 0.0000 
LRX 0.803783 0.290537 2.766544 0.0073 
LPMETH -0.096546 0.095486 -1.011103 0.3157 
LRF 0.028019 0.056329 0.497428 0.6205 
LUSCOR -0.372275 0.231333 -1.609261 0.1123 
LUSINC 0.390712 1.596812 0.244683 0.8075 
LT 0.818834 0.249878 3.276939 0.0017 
     
     
R-squared 0.705902     Mean dependent var 9.636644 
Adjusted R-squared 0.661342     S.D. dependent var 0.370900 
S.E. of regression 0.215843     Akaike info criterion -0.096970 
Sum squared resid 3.074814     Schwarz criterion 0.237860 
Log likelihood 14.73333     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.036959 
F-statistic 15.84149     Durbin-Watson stat 0.580333 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Price estimate by DEA used for price of cocaine estimate—Price estimate of methamphetamine 
used for price of cocaine substitute 
Dependent Variable: LCSKGS   
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Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/04/09   Time: 01:03   
Sample (adjusted): 1988Q4 2007Q4  
Included observations: 77 after adjustments  
     
     
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -10.50381 15.39736 -0.682182 0.4975 
LCOCIP(-1) 0.324160 0.253039 1.281068 0.2047 
LCOLCOR -0.042402 0.018166 -2.334113 0.0226 
LDEAOBAP 0.357149 0.349713 1.021263 0.3109 
LOLE -3.081873 0.404077 -7.626953 0.0000 
LPCOC 0.316985 0.149857 2.115257 0.0382 
LPMETH -0.093600 0.098130 -0.953842 0.3436 
LRF 0.007405 0.056661 0.130686 0.8964 
LUSCOR -0.237573 0.230632 -1.030093 0.3067 
LUSINC -0.549079 1.593886 -0.344491 0.7316 
LT 0.921713 0.259330 3.554207 0.0007 
     
     
R-squared 0.692634     Mean dependent var 9.636644 
Adjusted R-squared 0.646063     S.D. dependent var 0.370900 
S.E. of regression 0.220658     Akaike info criterion -0.052843 
Sum squared resid 3.213535     Schwarz criterion 0.281987 
Log likelihood 13.03444     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.081086 
F-statistic 14.87274     Durbin-Watson stat 0.696590 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Price estimate by DEA used for price of cocaine estimate—Price of alcohol used for price of 
cocaine substitute 
Dependent Variable: LCSKGS   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/04/09   Time: 01:04   
Sample (adjusted): 1988Q4 2007Q4  
Included observations: 77 after adjustments  
     
     
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -30.74121 16.48541 -1.864753 0.0667 
LCOCIP(-1) 0.264557 0.240567 1.099725 0.2754 
LCOLCOR -0.042916 0.017212 -2.493366 0.0152 
LDEAOBAP 0.089896 0.347204 0.258913 0.7965 
LOLE -2.954145 0.387236 -7.628796 0.0000 
LPCOC 0.270703 0.140227 1.930463 0.0578 
LALCP 5.120115 1.824510 2.806296 0.0066 
LRF 0.017020 0.054049 0.314905 0.7538 
LUSCOR -0.531774 0.229486 -2.317235 0.0236 
LUSINC -0.520107 1.406282 -0.369846 0.7127 
LT -1.074044 0.787722 -1.363481 0.1774 
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R-squared 0.721614     Mean dependent var 9.636644 
Adjusted R-squared 0.679435     S.D. dependent var 0.370900 
S.E. of regression 0.209998     Akaike info criterion -0.151875 
Sum squared resid 2.910540     Schwarz criterion 0.182954 
Log likelihood 16.84720     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.017947 
F-statistic 17.10811     Durbin-Watson stat 0.749503 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Regressions in Table 4 
Price estimate by DEA used for price of cocaine estimate 
Dependent Variable: LCSKGS   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/04/09   Time: 00:56   
Sample (adjusted): 1988Q4 2007Q4  
Included observations: 77 after adjustments  
     
     
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -52.36618 18.16588 -2.882666 0.0053 
LCOCIP(-1) 0.135418 0.237769 0.569537 0.5710 
LCOLCOR -0.048556 0.016749 -2.898986 0.0051 
LDEAOBAP -0.049222 0.339431 -0.145013 0.8851 
LOLE -2.794122 0.378903 -7.374247 0.0000 
LPCOC 0.333221 0.137541 2.422699 0.0182 
LPMETH -0.242663 0.098782 -2.456551 0.0167 
LALCP 7.072279 1.929874 3.664632 0.0005 
LRF 0.025051 0.052201 0.479892 0.6329 
LUSCOR -0.484500 0.222040 -2.182041 0.0327 
LUSINC 1.318294 1.548392 0.851396 0.3977 
LT -2.250137 0.897628 -2.506758 0.0147 
     
     
R-squared 0.745264     Mean dependent var 9.636644 
Adjusted R-squared 0.702155     S.D. dependent var 0.370900 
S.E. of regression 0.202419     Akaike info criterion -0.214682 
Sum squared resid 2.663279     Schwarz criterion 0.150587 
Log likelihood 20.26525     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.068578 
F-statistic 17.28784     Durbin-Watson stat 0.845197 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Real exchange rate used for price of cocaine estimate 
Dependent Variable: LCSKGS   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/04/09   Time: 00:56   
Sample (adjusted): 1988Q4 2007Q4  
Included observations: 77 after adjustments  
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 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -42.78505 18.87829 -2.266363 0.0268 
LCOCIP(-1) -0.112169 0.284078 -0.394854 0.6942 
LCOLCOR -0.042299 0.017552 -2.409930 0.0188 
LDEAOBAP -0.088382 0.343840 -0.257044 0.7980 
LOLE -2.500189 0.421810 -5.927284 0.0000 
LRX 0.565482 0.289235 1.955095 0.0549 
LPMETH -0.203556 0.098545 -2.065616 0.0429 
LALCP 5.746443 2.047571 2.806468 0.0066 
LRF 0.032873 0.053633 0.612917 0.5421 
LUSCOR -0.530541 0.227257 -2.334540 0.0227 
LUSINC 1.624398 1.581915 1.026856 0.3083 
LT -1.759914 0.949131 -1.854238 0.0682 
     
     
R-squared 0.737687     Mean dependent var 9.636644 
Adjusted R-squared 0.693296     S.D. dependent var 0.370900 
S.E. of regression 0.205408     Akaike info criterion -0.185371 
Sum squared resid 2.742497     Schwarz criterion 0.179897 
Log likelihood 19.13679     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.039267 
F-statistic 16.61779     Durbin-Watson stat 0.634734 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Regression in Table 5-a 
First stage of Hausman Test—Two Stage Least Squares 
Date: 04/25/09   Time: 17:18    
Sample (adjusted): 1988Q4 2007Q4   
Included observations: 77 after adjustments  
Instrument list: LRX  LCOCIP(-1) LCOLCOR LCOLPRO LDEAOBAP LOLE 
        LPMETH LALCP LRF LUSCOR LUSINC LT  
     
 Coefficient 
Std. 
Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -49.4934 19.31938 -2.56185286 0.012739 
LCOCIP(-1) 0.165007 0.252726 0.65290852 0.516118 
LCOLCOR -0.05158 0.017486 -2.94975191 0.004417 
LCOLPRO -0.13367 0.378239 -0.35339512 0.724936 
LDEAOBAP -0.20013 0.359762 -0.55627521 0.579933 
LOLE -2.84488 0.394848 -7.20500855 7.53E-10 
LPMETH -0.19183 0.102952 -1.86325942 0.066945 
LALCP 6.871058 2.017237 3.40617303 0.001134 
LRF 0.020846 0.057421 0.36303114 0.71776 
LUSCOR -0.46786 0.231811 -2.01829817 0.047691 
LUSINC 1.224158 1.618806 0.75621039 0.452255 
LT -2.22478 0.950205 -2.34137189 0.02229 
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R-squared 0.722794     Mean dependent var 9.636644 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.675882     S.D. dependent var 0.3709 
S.E. of regression 0.211158     Sum squared resid 2.898204 
F-statistic 15.40753     Durbin-Watson stat 0.639879 
Prob(F-statistic) 3.32E-14     Second-Stage SSR 2.898204 
 
Regression in Table 5-b 
Second stage of Hausman Test—Regress instruments against residuals from first stage 
Date: 04/25/09   Time: 17:20    
Sample (adjusted): 1988Q4 2007Q4   
Included observations: 77 after adjustments  
     
 Coefficient 
Std. 
Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 5.857343 19.16061 0.305697076 0.760827 
LCOCIP(-1) -0.27809 0.286025 -0.97225338 0.334585 
LCOLCOR 0.010368 0.01794 0.57792271 0.565344 
LCOLPRO 0.272883 0.396248 0.688667946 0.493521 
LDEAOBAP 0.084111 0.355005 0.236927827 0.81347 
LOLE 0.371638 0.431553 0.861163226 0.392363 
LRX 0.604328 0.311489 1.940124828 0.056773 
LPMETH -0.01891 0.101301 -0.18669469 0.852491 
LALCP -1.15264 2.063061 -0.55870154 0.578315 
LRF 0.006387 0.056334 0.113381689 0.910083 
LUSCOR -0.07069 0.22994 -0.30743565 0.75951 
LUSINC 0.465554 1.603504 0.290335615 0.772498 
LT 0.441083 0.957992 0.46042432 0.646772 
     
R-squared 0.055547     Mean dependent var -1.26E-14 
Adjusted R-
squared -0.12154     S.D. dependent var 0.19528 
S.E. of regression 0.206807     Akaike info criterion -0.16132 
Sum squared 
resid 2.737218     Schwarz criterion 0.234383 
Log likelihood 19.21098     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.00304 
F-statistic 0.313674     Durbin-Watson stat 0.64638 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.984545    
 
Regressions in Table 6 
Real exchange rate used for price of cocaine estimate—Price of alcohol used for price of cocaine 
substitute 
Dependent Variable: LCSKGS    
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Method: Least Squares    
Date: 04/20/09   Time: 19:09    
Sample (adjusted): 1989 2007    
Included observations: 19 after adjustments  
     
 Coefficient 
Std. 
Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.29755148 56.41863 0.005273994 0.995939 
LCOCIP(-1) 0.18149818 0.650275 0.279110025 0.788227 
LCOLCOR -0.0724091 0.058029 -1.24780686 0.252223 
LCOLPRO 1.09884382 0.966767 1.136617207 0.293107 
LDEAOBAP 0.57759568 0.887201 0.651031308 0.535805 
LOLE -1.8444711 1.120272 -1.64644979 0.143665 
LRX -1.530276 0.835767 -1.83098454 0.109787 
LALCP 4.74201988 8.012653 0.59181649 0.572583 
LRF 1.55291254 0.686248 2.26290192 0.058082 
LUSCOR -0.9628254 0.581789 -1.65493869 0.141911 
LUSINC -3.6512065 4.028397 -0.906367 0.394869 
LT -1.3366859 3.587925 -0.37255128 0.720506 
     
R-squared 0.88976155     Mean dependent var 11.02301 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.7165297     S.D. dependent var 0.381063 
S.E. of regression 0.20288516     Akaike info criterion -0.08772 
Sum squared resid 0.28813673     Schwarz criterion 0.508764 
Log likelihood 12.8333798     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.013225 
F-statistic 5.13624693     Durbin-Watson stat 2.485824 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.01975078    
 
 
Real exchange rate used for price of cocaine estimate—Price estimate of methamphetamine 
used for price of cocaine substitute 
Dependent Variable: LCSKGS    
Method: Least Squares    
Date: 04/20/09   Time: 19:09    
Sample (adjusted): 1989 2007    
Included observations: 19 after adjustments  
     
 Coefficient 
Std. 
Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 44.569663 30.27859 1.471986179 0.184502 
LCOCIP(-1) 0.6946068 0.608499 1.141507807 0.2912 
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LCOLCOR 0.0108948 0.054905 0.198430561 0.848348 
LCOLPRO 1.3768813 0.794081 1.733929474 0.126524 
LDEAOBAP 1.771619 0.8119 2.182064572 0.065441 
LOLE 0.2399042 1.390238 0.172563492 0.867878 
LRX -2.09516 0.623831 -3.358536485 0.012109 
LPMETH -0.492251 0.254285 -1.935823723 0.094112 
LRF 1.4505166 0.493061 2.941859882 0.021656 
LUSCOR -0.263262 0.507065 -0.519187279 0.619637 
LUSINC -4.265023 3.321713 -1.283983026 0.24001 
LT -0.255595 0.689165 -0.370875694 0.721699 
     
R-squared 0.924607     Mean dependent var 11.02301 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8061323     S.D. dependent var 0.381063 
S.E. of regression 0.1677835     Akaike info criterion -0.46766 
Sum squared resid 0.1970591     Schwarz criterion 0.128832 
Log likelihood 16.442727     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.36671 
F-statistic 7.8042554     Durbin-Watson stat 2.809379 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0059467    
 
Price estimate by DEA used for price of cocaine estimate—Price estimate of methamphetamine 
used for price of cocaine substitute 
Dependent Variable: LCSKGS    
Method: Least Squares    
Date: 04/20/09   Time: 19:09    
Sample (adjusted): 1989 2007    
Included observations: 19 after adjustments  
     
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 25.68325 50.130272 0.512330144 0.624185 
LCOCIP(-1) 0.600078 0.9802652 0.612158483 0.559784 
LCOLCOR -0.06392 0.0747093 -0.85562089 0.420527 
LCOLPRO 0.653565 1.1168773 0.585171252 0.576801 
LDEAOBAP 1.238637 1.1778454 1.05161264 0.32792 
LOLE -2.75847 1.8957977 -1.45504248 0.188987 
LPCOC 0.674549 0.5615393 1.201249819 0.268717 
LPMETH -0.12191 0.3799011 -0.32089272 0.75766 
LRF 1.15714 0.8060528 1.435563176 0.194265 
LUSCOR -0.55202 0.7612663 -0.72512877 0.491896 
LUSINC -5.36136 5.0736445 -1.05670854 0.325743 
LT 1.000285 0.9594161 1.042597843 0.331798 
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R-squared 0.836768     Mean dependent var 11.02301 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.580261     S.D. dependent var 0.381063 
S.E. of regression 0.24688     Akaike info criterion 0.304802 
Sum squared 
resid 0.426649     Schwarz criterion 0.901289 
Log likelihood 9.104385     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.405751 
F-statistic 3.262163     Durbin-Watson stat 1.770669 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.063729    
 
Price estimate by DEA used for price of cocaine estimate—Price of alcohol used for price of 
cocaine substitute 
Dependent Variable: LCSKGS    
Method: Least Squares    
Date: 04/20/09   Time: 19:10    
Sample (adjusted): 1989 2007    
Included observations: 19 after adjustments  
     
 Coefficient 
Std. 
Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -57.533901 57.59835 -0.998881021 0.351122 
LCOCIP(-1) 0.32882153 0.635792 0.517183854 0.620964 
LCOLCOR -0.1062277 0.053539 -1.984115888 0.087648 
LCOLPRO 0.83928974 0.934965 0.897669311 0.399183 
LDEAOBAP 0.39461065 0.887567 0.444598056 0.670032 
LOLE -2.9783828 1.039572 -2.865007309 0.024164 
LPCOC 0.76602431 0.447924 1.710166971 0.130978 
LALCP 12.5143037 7.127409 1.755799901 0.122551 
LRF 1.55159919 0.705016 2.200801471 0.063656 
LUSCOR -1.1717517 0.58823 -1.991994453 0.086636 
LUSINC -2.9566078 4.254742 -0.694896991 0.509521 
LT -4.4613167 3.285918 -1.35770788 0.216697 
     
R-squared 0.88500939     Mean dependent var 11.02301 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.70430985     S.D. dependent var 0.381063 
S.E. of regression 0.20721202     Akaike info criterion -0.04552 
Sum squared resid 0.30055774     Schwarz criterion 0.550968 
Log likelihood 12.4324344     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.05543 
F-statistic 4.89768483     Durbin-Watson stat 1.815726 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.02248924    
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Regressions in Table 7 
Price estimate by DEA used for price of cocaine estimate 
Dependent Variable: LCSKGS    
Method: Least Squares    
Date: 04/20/09   Time: 19:10    
Sample (adjusted): 1989 2007    
Included observations: 19 after adjustments  
     
 Coefficient 
Std. 
Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -49.834197 61.19894 -0.814298417 0.44658 
LCOCIP(-1) 0.6895113 0.859616 0.802115109 0.453076 
LCOLCOR -0.0827125 0.066257 -1.248366509 0.258401 
LCOLPRO 0.7744685 0.980104 0.790190163 0.459499 
LDEAOBAP 0.745815 1.068008 0.698323228 0.511119 
LOLE -2.1160273 1.698803 -1.245599178 0.259346 
LPCOC 0.6651196 0.491604 1.352957791 0.224823 
LALCP 13.351548 7.541486 1.770413411 0.127051 
LPMETH -0.2224718 0.337384 -0.659402294 0.534113 
LRF 1.7016894 0.769749 2.210708176 0.069076 
LUSCOR -0.9459845 0.702589 -1.346426175 0.2268 
LUSINC -3.6174499 4.549421 -0.795145124 0.456822 
LT -5.272006 3.641032 -1.447942925 0.197793 
     
R-squared 0.8927795     Mean dependent var 11.02301 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.6783385     S.D. dependent var 0.381063 
S.E. of regression 0.2161205     Akaike info criterion -0.01022 
Sum squared resid 0.2802485     Schwarz criterion 0.635976 
Log likelihood 13.097083     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.099143 
F-statistic 4.1632874     Durbin-Watson stat 1.770819 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0456282    
 
Real exchange rate used for price of cocaine estimate 
Dependent Variable: LCSKGS    
Method: Least Squares    
Date: 04/20/09   Time: 19:10    
Sample (adjusted): 1989 2007    
Included observations: 19 after adjustments   
     
 Coefficient 
Std. 
Error t-Statistic Prob.   
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C 15.0105266 48.55316 0.309156557 0.767657 
LCOCIP(-1) 0.78439054 0.635466 1.234354942 0.263219 
LCOLCOR -0.0058774 0.060255 -0.097543515 0.925472 
LCOLPRO 1.27257629 0.826537 1.539648073 0.174573 
LDEAOBAP 1.5107664 0.896815 1.684591276 0.14305 
LOLE 0.20423245 1.429329 0.142886975 0.891057 
LRX -1.8240426 0.726517 -2.510667375 0.045862 
LPMETH -0.5027829 0.261643 -1.921636885 0.103032 
LALCP 5.40702079 6.8181 0.793039289 0.457958 
LRF 1.68601994 0.587287 2.870863734 0.028395 
LUSCOR -0.4367836 0.565141 -0.772875373 0.468939 
LUSINC -4.010251 3.428507 -1.169678431 0.286487 
LT -2.6711311 3.127169 -0.854169238 0.425795 
     
R-squared 0.93175983     Mean dependent var 11.02301 
Adjusted R-squared 0.79527949     S.D. dependent var 0.381063 
S.E. of regression 0.17241585     Akaike info criterion -0.46207 
Sum squared resid 0.17836335     Schwarz criterion 0.184122 
Log likelihood 17.3896971     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.35271 
F-statistic 6.82706268     Durbin-Watson stat 2.656627 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.01371132    
 
Plot of Residuals Table 2 
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Real exchange rate used for price of cocaine estimate—Price estimate of methamphetamine 
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Price estimate by DEA used for price of cocaine estimate—Price estimate of methamphetamine 
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Plot of Residuals Table 3 
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Real exchange rate used for price of cocaine estimate—Price estimate of methamphetamine 
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Price estimate by DEA used for price of cocaine estimate—Price estimate of methamphetamine 
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Plot of Residuals Table 4 
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